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TIGHTENING THE NET OF FLORIDA'S RICO ACT
JENNIFER DALEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
T OURISTS and other visitors to the Sunshine State can expect
more than a warm climate and beautiful beaches these days. Be-
cause Florida has had the highest reported violent crime rate in the
nation, it has been referred to as the "state of crime."' In the United
States as a whole, while the overall level of crime has decreased since
its peak in 1981, the victimization rate for violent crimes has risen
since its decline in 1986 and 1989.2 Concerns about crime permeate
election campaigns, legislative debates, and public opinion polls.3
These factors, combined with increased media coverage of violent
crime over the past few years-including the coverage of the recent
attacks on Florida tourists'-have fueled local, national, and interna-
* Judicial Clerk to Chief Judge E. Earle Zehmer, First District Court of Appeal, Talla-
hassee, Florida; B.S., 1987, University of Tampa; J.D., 1990, University of Florida.
1. Vickie Chacere, The State of Crime, TAMA TRmuNE, Oct. 3, 1993, at IA (reporting on
crime statistics compiled by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement for the years 1982-
1992); see Violent Crime Up, According to FBI, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Oct. 3, 1993, at I lA (reporting
on a statement made by FBI Director Louis Freeh and noting that FBI statistics show that Flor-
ida has the highest crime rate of all 50 states and Dade County has the worst crime rate of all of
the nation's metropolitan areas).
2. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VIC-
TIMIZATION n' THE UNITED STATES: 1973-1990 TRENDS 1 (n.d.) (summarizing the Crime Victimi-
zation Survey Report, December 1992, NCJ-139564); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED
STATES DEP'T OF JusTI E, CRIMNAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1991, at 3 (n.d.)
(summarizing the Crime Victimization Survey Report, December 1992, NCJ-139563, and finding
an 11% increase, labeled as significant, in the number of violent crime attempts, primarily at-
tributable to a rise in assaults). See also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF
JUSTICe, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMmNAL JUSTICE STAnsTIcs-1991, at 257-70 (1992) (Tables 3.2-3.15).
3. JAMES GAROFALO, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUnLIC OPrNIoN ABOUT CRIME:
TiE ATTITUDES OF VICTIMS AND NoNvicTims IN SELECTED CITIES 13 (1977).
4. Between December 1992 and September 16, 1993, nine tourists-four from Germany,
two from England, two from Canada, and one from Venezuela-were killed and others
wounded in South Florida and a rest stop in Monticello. The latest killing was of a British
tourist. The eight earlier reported killings occurred in south Florida, including the savage beating
and killing of a 39-year-old German woman, who while driving a rental car from Miami, got lost
and strayed off Interstate 95 into Liberty City, and the killing of a German man who, on his
honeymoon, was shot in his rental vehicle even after heeding tourist warnings not to stop their
cars if hit from the rear by other vehicles. See Dana Peck & Tony Welch, A Break in Tourist
Slaying, TALLALASSEE DEMOCRAT, Sept. 16, 1993, at IA (reporting on the arrest of teenage sus-
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tional fears about rising crime rates in Florida and the nation far be-
yond the actual recorded increase in crime.5 Consequently, more
citizens are demanding new or improved legislation and greater en-
forcement of legislation aimed at addressing Florida's crime problem.
These demands have been met with a number of federal and state
measures, including legislation aimed at imposing harsher criminal
sentences for certain offenses.
To address earlier outcries of Floridians for solutions to Florida's
crime problem, the Florida Legislature enacted Florida's Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).6 Primarily be-
cause of the advantages over other criminal laws, federal and state
governments have turned to RICO Acts as alternatives to other legis-
lation, such as conspiracy laws which were previously used to prose-
cute large numbers of defendants in a single trial. 7 One advantage is
that RICO Acts solve the deficiency in other criminal statutes that in-
carcerate the individual members of organizations engaged in criminal
activity, but rarely eliminate the organizations.' Another advantage is
that RICO Acts eliminate problems involving evidence gathering and
constitutional protections, which prosecutors previously encountered
in prosecuting organized crime. 9 Other advantages of RICO Acts in-
clude the availability of civil remedies to prosecutors and affected in-
dividuals, harsher penalties and new sanctions, injunctions to prevent
defendants from using assets gained from racketeering to obtain legal
pects in Monticello for the killing and attempted robbery of a British tourist who, along with a
companion, stopped at a highway rest stop to take a nap and was shot when he tried to escape
from the teenagers); Manny Garcia & Gail Epstein, A Brutal Welcome to Miami, TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT, Sept. 9, 1993, at IA; see also Fight Fear in Florida, TM, Apr. 19, 1993, at 22
(reporting the attacks on tourists, including the German Consul statement that he is considering
warning tourists to stay away from Miami, and the changes made to the city to avoid being listed
with current travel-agency pariahs like Egypt and Northern Ireland); Christopher Sullivan, News
Offers a Glimpse of a Flawed Paradise, TALLAHASSE DEMOCRAT, Apr. 14, 1993, at 5B (reporting
that the attacks on tourists and the recent highway sniping incidents in Jacksonville may affect
tourism and Florida's image); Chuck Clark, Chiles Reacts to Crime Spree Against Tourists,
TAL.LAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Apr. 6, 1993, at IA (reporting that the robberies of three Danish fe-
male tourists in Miami on April 5 took place while the Governor's Task Force on Safety was
discussing the recent "plague" of crime on Miami tourists three blocks away).
5. See Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice, 16 Caimu & JUST.
REVIEW oF Rs. 99, 117-18 (1992).
6. FLA. STAT. §§ 895.01-.06 (1991 & Supp. 1992); see infra notes 25-26 and accompanying
text.
7. Barry Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDAM L.
REV. 165, 167 (1980); The Office of the Att'y Gen. & the New Jersey County Prosecutor's
Ass'n, A Status Report on the War Against Organized Crime in New Jersey: Some Recommen-
dations for the Future, 6 CRIM. JUST. Q. 50 (1978) [hereinafter Status Report].
8. Status Report, supra note 7, at 57; see infra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
9. Id.; see infra notes 33-39, 78-81 and accompanying text.
FLORIDA'S RICO ACT
representation or to prepare a defense, and expanded doctrines re-
garding admissibility of evidence. 0
In 1977, Florida legislators passed the original version of Florida's
RICO Act intending to prevent racketeers involved in organized crime
from infiltrating legitimate businesses." Florida's current RICO Act
now reaches a broader scope of criminal conduct not originally envi-
sioned by the federal RICO Act,' 2 upon which it was patterned, or the
original Florida RICO Act." Among other things, the current Act
prohibits individuals from using or investing proceeds received from
or derived through a "pattern of racketeering activity" to acquire ti-
tle, right, interest, or equity in real property or to establish or main-
tain an enterprise; acquiring or maintaining control of an
"enterprise" or real property through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity; being employed by or associating with an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity; and conspiring or attempting to en-
gage in such activities.' 4 Furthermore, the Act prohibits individuals
from acquiring or maintaining an interest in, or control of, an enter-
prise or real property through the collection of an unlawful debt, us-
ing or investing proceeds from the collection of an unlawful debt, or
conducting or participating in an enterprise through the collection of
an unlawful debt.' 5
This Article discusses the scope of Florida's current RICO Act and
compares it to the federal RICO Act. The Article also discusses the
elements necessary to successfully prosecute defendants under the
Florida Act and the problems that Florida courts have encountered in
attempting to apply the Act. Finally, the Article analyzes the critical
elements of a successful RICO prosecution and proposes several
changes to Florida's RICO Act.
II. THE ORiGINAL NET
The Florida RICO Act was not the Legislature's first attempt at
reaching organized crime in Florida. In 1969, Florida enacted legisla-
tion which allowed the Department of Legal Affairs to institute civil
proceedings to forfeit the charter, revoke the permit, or enjoin the
operation of a corporation when the corporate officers, managers, or
10. Tarlow, supra note 7, at 170.
11. See infra note 25.
12. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988 & Supp. 1991). The original federal RICO Act became
effective on October 15, 1970, and was enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, Prub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970); see also infra note 22.
13. See FLA. STAT. §§ 943.46-.464 (1977) [current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 895.01-.06 (1991
& Supp. 1992)].
14. FLA. STAT. § 895.03 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
15. Id.
1993]
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persons controlling the management or operation of the corporation
engaged in certain activities with the knowledge of the president and a
majority of the board of directors, or under circumstances where
those individuals should have known of the activities.16 These activi-
ties included organized, violent, revolutionary, or unlawful activity
aimed at overthrowing the state government or any of its political sub-
divisions, institutions, or agencies; organized homosexuality; organ-
ized crimes against nature; organized prostitution; organized
gambling; organized narcotics; organized extortion; and direct or indi-
rect connection with organizations, syndicates, or criminal societies
engaged in such activities.' 7 In 1971, however, the Florida Supreme
Court held the legislation unconstitutional as it violated the Due Proc-
ess Clauses of both the Florida and the United States Constitutions. 8
After repealing that legislation, 19 the Legislature enacted the original
Florida RICO Act, which became effective on October 1, 197720 and
was patterned after the federal RICO Act. 21 Congress enacted the fed-
eral RICO Act in 1970 to address what the federal government saw as
a lack of state and federal legislation addressing the growing national
problem of organized crime. 22 Congress had full knowledge that a
number of state crimes were included within the scope of "racketeer-
ing activity." 23 Nonetheless, Congress passed the Act despite objec-
tions that it was acting beyond its enumerated powers.2
16. FLA. STAT. §§ 932.58-.60 (1969), repealed by ch. 83-214, § 25, 1983 Fla. Laws 852.
17. Id.
18. Aztec Motel, Inc. v. State ex rel. Faircloth, 251 So. 2d 849, 854 (Fla. 1971).
19. Ch. 83-214, § 25, 1983 Fla. Laws 852.
20. See supra note 13; see ch. 77-334, §§ 1-8, 1977 Fla. Laws 1399, 1399-1406.
21. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
22. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). The Statement of Findings and Purpose of
this Act states in pertinent part:
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisti-
cated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from
America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and cor-
ruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money ob-
tained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking ... ; (3) this
money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business
and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic process .. .; and (5)
organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process
of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to
bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of
those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to
the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.
Id. at 922-23; see United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-93 (1981) (discussing and quoting
findings from the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 922, and hearings held on the
matter).
23. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 586-87.
24. Id. Turkette provides an extensive discussion of the legislative history of the federal
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Using legislation similar to the federal RICO Act, the Florida RICO
Act was enacted to address the state's growing problem of organized
crime. The original declared purpose of Florida's RICO Act was to
target organized crime and to prevent organized criminal organiza-
tions from infiltrating and corrupting legitimate businesses. 25 The Leg-
islature again referred to the 1977 Act's original purpose "to combat
organized crime" when it amended the Act in 1981 to allow the state
to successfully seize real and personal property gained through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity and to prevent further investment in such
property by persons charged under the RICO Act.26 However, while
the declared purpose of the original Florida and federal RICO Acts
focused on targeting organized crime, neither Act expressly required
the prosecutor or plaintiff to prove the connection between the tar-
geted individuals and "organized crime. ' 27 The absence of such lan-
guage produced conflicting opinions by the federal circuit courts on
whether the federal RICO Act applies to illegitimate businesses as well
as to legitimate businesses. 28 The United States Supreme Court re-
solved this conflict by holding that, on its face, the federal Act ap-
pears to include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises within its
RICO Act. Id. See Jan Neuenschwander, RICO Extended to Apply to Wholly Illegitimate Enter-
prises, 72 J. Cums. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 1426, 1435-40 (1981); Jacqueline Dowd, Comment, Inter-
preting RICO! In Florida the Rules are Different, 40 U. FLA. L. Rav. 127, 130-34 (1988).
25. The preamble of chapter 77-334, 1977 Florida Laws, reads in relevant part:
WHEREAS, organized crime is infiltrating and corrupting legitimate businesses oper-
ating within this state and this infiltration and corruption uses vast amounts of
money, power, and all the techniques of violence, intimidation, and other forms of
unlawful conduct to accomplish its goals, and
WHEREAS, in furtherance of such *infiltration and corruption, organized criminal
operatives utilize and apply to their unlawful purposes laws of the State of Florida
conferring and relating to the privilege of engaging in various types of business enter-
prises, and
WHEREAS, infiltration and corruption of legitimate business provide an outlet for
illegally obtained capital, harm innocent investors, entrepreneurs, merchants, and
consumers, interfere with free competition, and thereby constitute a substantial dan-
ger to the economic and general welfare of the State of Florida ....
Id. For an extensive discussion of the legislative history of the Florida RICO Act, see Raymer F.
Maguire, 1II, Note, Racketeers and Non-Racketeers Alike Should Fear Florida's RICO Act, 6
FLA. ST. U. L. REy. 483, 495-513 (1978).
26. Ch. 81-141, Preamble, 1981 Fla. Laws 290-91.
27. FLA. STAT. § 895.03 (1991); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988); see H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Boyd v. State, 578 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied,
581 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1991).
28. Prior to United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), all of the federal circuit courts,
except the First Circuit, interpreted the federal RICO Act as encompassing illegitimate enter-
prises. See Neuenschwander, supra note 24, at 1430.
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scope because "neither the language nor structure of RICO limits its
application to legitimate 'enterprises.' ' 29 The Florida Supreme Court,
on the other hand, has acknowledged a conflict between the original
Act's preamble, which focused on organized crime infiltrating legiti-
mate businesses, and the actual language of the Florida Act, which
states that it reaches licit as well as illicit enterprises.30 The court, how-
ever, held that this conflict is not a constitutional defect and that the
Florida Act applies to both types of enterprises." Despite these hold-
ings, federal and Florida courts have made it clear that the Act is in-
tended to reach more than criminals who merely get together to
commit sporadic acts of crime. 32
Just as federal courts have upheld the federal RICO Act, Florida
courts have upheld the amended Florida RICO Act against a number
of constitutional challenges, including due process and equal protec-
tion. In the first RICO Act case it considered, the Florida Supremie
Court rejected the argument that the Act's "pattern of racketeering
activity" definition is unconstitutionally overbroad because the Legis-
lature impermissibly included within its scope a host of misdemeanors
that are unrelated to organized criminal activity.33 The court has also
rejected arguments that the Florida Act is facially unconstitutional be-
cause it imposes strict liability without requiring criminal intent or
knowledge and that its sanctions are predicated on presumptively pro-
tected activities of free speech, press, and association. 4
The Act has also been challenged unsuccessfully in the state district
courts on a number of theories. These challenges include the following
arguments: that the Legislature impermissibly delegated, without as-
29. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 588; see Neuenschwander, supra note 24 (discussing the history
and impact of Turk'ette).
30. Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178, 1180-81 (Fla. 1981).
31. Id.
32. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. lmrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985); United States v. Flynn, 852
F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974 (1988); Boyd v. State, 578 So. 2d 718 (Fla.
3d DCA), rev. denied, 581 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1991); see also discussion infra parts III and IV.
33. Moorehead v. State, 383 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. 1980). The Florida Supreme Court held
that even if there was merit to the argument, the argument did not apply because the defendant
was charged with five auto thefts within a two-month period, which is not the type of minor
criminal activity upon which the defendant's argument was based. Id. The federal courts also
have upheld the federal Act against vagueness challenges. See United States v. Tripp, 782 F.2d
38, 42 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1128 (1986); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364-65 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1050 (1975); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 441-42 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1105 (1975). But see Firestone v. Galbreath, 747 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (finding that
the federal Act's pattern definition was unconstitutionally vague as applied to a case involving a
dispute between family members concerning whether certain property should have remained in a
relative's estate), aff'd, 976 F.2d 276 (6th Cir. 1992).
34. Bowden v. State, 402 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1981).
19931 FLORIDA 'S RICO ACT
certainable standards, basic policy decisions to the prosecutor by al-
lowing the prosecutor to either pursue misdemeanor convictions under
predicate offenses for each separate gambling incident, or felony con-
victions under the Act for an entire gambling episode;"5 that the Act
imposes cruel and unusual punishment because it raises the level of
punishment for conduct involving the commission of two or more sec-
ond degree misdemeanors to that imposed for the commission of a
first degree felony;36 and that the Act impairs the constitutional su-
premacy of federal law." Finally, the Florida Supreme Court has re-
jected challenges to the Florida Act as an ex post facto law and has
stated that the Act may be applied retroactively, as long as one of the
predicate incidents occurred after the Act's effective date.38
III. THE CURRENT ACT
A. Criminal Provisions
Section 895.03, Florida Statutes, is the heart of Florida's current
RICO criminal provisions.3 9 The section lists the conduct prohibited
by the Act:
35. Vickery v. State, 539 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 549 So. 2d 1014 (Fla.
1989).
36. Id. at 501-02. The First District Court of Appeal rejected this argument in holding that
the Act provides punishment for participating in an ongoing criminal enterprise, which is a dis-
tinct and separate crime, and does not merely provide an enhanced sentence for repeated misde-
meanors. Id. Also, the court's examination of the punishment imposed under racketeering acts
by other jurisdictions, including the federal government, indicated that the penalty imposed by
Florida for RICO violations did not vary greatly from that imposed in other jurisdictions for
RICO violations. Id.; see Carlson v. State, 405 So. 2d 173, 174 (Fla. 1981) (rejecting the argu-
ment that the Florida RICO Act imposes cruel and unusual punishment and noting that the
determination of maximum penalties for violations of laws remains a matter for the Legislature).
37. Rogers v. State, 487 So. 2d 57, 58 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). In Rogers, the Third District
Court of Appeal rejected the argument made by a defendant whose RICO conviction was based
on a predicate offense of federal mail fraud. The defendant argued that the Act impairs the
constitutional supremacy of federal law because it is based upon an alleged violation of the
federal mall fraud statute, the enforcement of which is already preempted by the federal govern-
ment. Id. In rejecting this argument, the court noted that Florida's RICO Act forbids racketeer-
ing, not the federal crime of mail fraud per se, and merely uses the federal offense to make up
the complete state charge. Id.; see United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981). The federal
courts also have upheld the federal RICO Act against arguments that it disturbs the state/federal
relationship and lacks authority under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Cap-
petto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1356 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
38. FLA. STAT. § 895.02(4) (1991); Carlson, 405 So. 2d at 174; State v. Whiddon, 384 So. 2d
1269, 1271 (Fla. 1980); see discussion infra part IV.C. The federal Act also has been upheld
against similar challenges to it as an unconstitutional expostfacto law. See also United States v.
Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364-65 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1975); United States v.
Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439
U.S. 801 (1978); United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1022 (D. Md.), supplemented by
415 F. Supp. 1025 (D. Md. 1976).
39. The original version of the Act was part of chapter 943, Florida Statutes, which covered
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(1) It is unlawful for any person who has with criminal intent4
received any proceeds derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern
of racketeering activity or through the collection of an unlawful debt
to use or invest, whether directly or indirectly, any part of such
proceeds, or the proceeds derived from the investment or use
thereof, in the acquisition of any title to, or any right, interest, or
equity in, real property or in the establishment or operation of any
enterprise.
(2) It is unlawful for any person, through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through the collection of an unlawful debt, to acquire or
maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any
enterprise or real property.
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by, or associated with,
any enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in
such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity or the
collection of an unlawful debt.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire or endeavor to violate
any of the provisions of subsections (1), (2), or (3).4 1
The fundamental conduct prohibited by section 895.03, a "pattern of
racketeering activity," involves the individual:
engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering conduct that have
the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods
of commission or that otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated incidents, provided at least one of
such incidents occurred after the effective date of this act and that
the last of such incidents occurred within 5 years after a prior
incident of racketeering conduct.4 2
An information or indictment that fails to allege this essential element
is subject to dismissal. 43
"criminal law enforcement," specifically sections 943.46-.464, Florida Statutes (1977). See supra
note 13.
40. This intent requirement is absent from the face of the federal RICO Act. See f8 U.S.C.
§ 1962 (1988). While commentators have criticized the federal Act for failing to include such an
element in section 1963 and have suggested that an intent requirement be read into this section,
they have disagreed as to the appropriate level of intent that should be applied. Cf. Tarlow,
supra note 7, at 180-85; Note, Investing Dirty Money: Section 1962(a) of the Organized Crime
ControlAct of 1970, 83 YALE L. J. 1491, 1502-08 (1974).
41. FLA. STAT. § 895.03 (1991).
42. FLA. STAT. § 895.02(4) (1991).
43. See State v. Lucas, 600 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 1992); Bowden v. State, 402 So. 2d 1173 (Fla.
1981); see also infra part IV (discussing the pattern of racketeering element and the other essen-
tial elements).
FLORIDA 'S RICO ACT
Like the federal RICO Act, the Florida Act defines the phrase
"racketeering activity. "" However, unlike the federal Act, the Florida
RICO Act's definition reaches not only the commission of certain
enumerated crimes which are chargeable by indictment or informa-
tion, but also any attempt, conspiracy, solicitation, coercion, or in-
timidation of another person to do so. 4 5 The list of the enumerated
crimes in the Florida RICO Act far outnumbers those in the federal
Act and specifically includes all racketeering activity reached by the
federal Act." Florida's list of prohibited activity covers a wide range
of crimes, felonies as well as misdemeanors,47 including those statutes
covering real estate time-share plans, environmental control, com-
puter-related crimes, perjury, tampering with jurors and witnesses,
dog racing, horse racing, jai alai frontons, and financial transac-
tions."
Neither the Florida RICO Act nor its federal counterpart requires
individual convictions on the enumerated crimes as a predicate to ob-
taining a racketeering conviction. The Florida RICO Act requires only
that the enumerated crime be "chargeable by indictment or informa-
tion" under the enumerated provisions of the Florida Statutes. 9 Simi-
larly, the federal Act requires enumerated crimes that are either
"chargeable" or "indictable." 50 Thus, inconsistent verdicts between
the predicates and the racketeering charge, alone, do not necessarily
require dismissal or reversal of the racketeering charge or conviction.,,
44. FLA. STAT. § 895.02(1) (1991).
45. Id. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988) (generally defining the phrase "racketeering activity"
as involving the act or threat to commit the enumerated offenses).
46. FLA. STAT. § 895.02(1)(a), (b) (1991).
47. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988).
48. See FLA. STAT. § 895.02(l)(a)l.-34. (1991). Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988). In State v.
Sun City Oil Co., 522 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), the Fifth District noted one unexplained
omission from the list of enumerated crimes in subsection 895.02(1)(a). The case involved a rack-
eteering prosecution against a distributor of fuel which used as predicate crimes some counts of
grand theft under section 812.13 and several counts of embezzlement under section 206.56, Flor-
ida Statutes (1983). Id. at 475. In dismissing several counts of the racketeering information based
on embezzlement under section 206.56 as predicate crimes, the court noted that while section
895.02 lists grand theft as a permissible predicate crime under section 812.12, it excludes embez-
zlement under section 206.56, which addresses the failure of distributors to account for collected
fuel taxes. Id. at 476. The court noted that the omission of section 206.56 did not appear to be a
legislative oversight because if the legislature had intended to include that section in the list of
enumerated crimes, it would have done so. Id. While section 206.56, Florida Statutes (1992),
now classifies the offense as theft of state funds and targets any person who engages in such
conduct, section 895.02 still omits that section from the list of enumerated crimes. See FLA.
STAT. § 895.02 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
49. FLA. STAT. § 895.02(l)(a) (1991) (emphasis added).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988).
51. Harvey v. State, 617 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); see United States v. Tinsley, 800
1993]
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For example, Florida's First District Court of Appeal affirmed a rack-
eteering conviction where the information charged one count of rack-
eteering and two separate counts of grand theft that served as the
predicate incidents for the racketeering count, even though the jury
was hung on one grand theft count and returned a not-guilty verdict
on the other count.5 2
With respect to the possible criminal penalties and fines that may be
imposed for racketeering, Florida's RICO Act penalties far exceed
those of the federal Act. Violation of the federal Act may result in a
fine of $25,000 (or a fine of not more than twice the gross profits or
proceeds received from the offense in lieu of the fine), imprisonment
for not more than twenty years (or life if the violation is based on a
racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty includes life), or
both." The federal government may also cause an individual or enter-
prise to forfeit any interest, security, property, contractual right, or
proceeds gained in violation of the federal Act . 4
Section 895.04 of the Florida RICO Act makes all violations of sec-
tion 895.03 a first degree felony punishable by a term of imprison-
ment not exceeding thirty years55 and a fine authorized by law.,,
Alternatively, if the offender obtains a thing of pecuniary value 7 or
causes personal injury or property damage through racketeering con-
duct, the court may impose a fine not exceeding three times the gross
value gained or three times the gross loss caused, whichever is greater,
F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1986) (affirming racketeering and racketeering conspiracy convictions where
the defendant was acquitted of one of the three predicate acts alleged in support of the racket-
eering offenses and of another predicate act charging that he used a communication facility to
distribute methamphetamine, and holding that the other alleged predicate act could not be used
as a predicate act for the RICO charge); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.) (acquit-
tals on the substantive offenses do not preclude their consideration as part of the RICO conspir-
acy), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
52. Harvey, 617 So. 2d at 1144; see Tinsley, 800 F.2d at 448. Cf Shaktman v. State, 529
So. 2d 711, 722-24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (regardless of any constitutional infirmity in the statute
covering the predicate incidents, the validity of the defendants' plea to the RICO offense based
on a pattern of bookmaking activity would not be affected; the section 849.25 violations merely
serve to make up the complete RICO charge), approved, 553 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1989).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988).
54. Id.
55. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(b) (1991). A life sentence may be imposed for habitual felony
offenders and habitual violent felony offenders. Id. § 775.084(4).
56. See id. § 775.083(b) (fine not exceeding $10,000).
57. Section 895.04(4), Florida Statutes, defines "pecuniary value" as meaning: "(a) Any-
thing of value in the form of money, a negotiable instrument, or a commercial interest .or any-
thing else the primary significance of which is economic advantage; or (b) Any other property or
service that has a value in excess of $100."
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plus court costs and the costs of investigation and prosecution reason-
ably incurred."
B. Civil Remedies
Like the federal RICO Act, 9 the pre-1986 Florida RICO Act pro-
vided civil remedies to the government and private individuals and
was aimed primarily at reducing the economic power of individuals
involved in organized criminal activity by divesting them of the fruits
of their "ill gotten gains."' 6 Civil remedies were available under chap-
ter 895 of the Florida RICO Act without any proof that the defendant
was convicted of organized criminal activity. 61 In 1986, however, the
Legislature divided these remedies between two chapters of the Flor-
ida Statutes-chapter 895, which allows public civil RICO actions
brought by the State and its subdivisions, 62 and the recently enacted
chapter 772, which allows private civil RICO actions by anyone. 63
These remedies were separated primarily to avoid the abuses of civil
RICO actions that the federal courts had been experiencing, such as
cases in which only a single contractual relationship was involved but
several acts of frauds were alleged to have arisen from the relation-
ship.64
58. Id. § 895.04(2).
59. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988). This provision has been held constitutional against a chal-
lenge that it is an invalid exercise of Congress' authority to regulate commerce. See United States
v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1355-58 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
60. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 (1981); see Comment, Organized Crime
and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for "Criminal Activity", 124 U. PA.
L. l~v. 192, 194 (1975).
61. Banderas v. Banco Cent. del Ecuador, 461 So. 2d 265, 269 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); see
Battlefield Builders, Inc. v. Swango, 743 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1984).
62. Nevertheless, injunctive relief is also available to "any aggrieved person," an undefined
phrase. FLA. STAT. § 895.05(6) (1991).
63. See ch. 86-277, §§ 3, 6, 1986 Fla. Laws 2036, 2040 (amending section 895.05, Florida
Statutes, and enacting chapter 772).
64. The majority decision documents the abuse in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S.
479 (1985):
Underlying the Court of Appeals' holding was its distress at the "extraordinary, if not
outrageous," uses to which civil RICO has been put. Instead of being used against
mobsters and organized criminals, it has become a tool for everyday fraud cases
brought against "respected and legitimate 'enterprises."' Yet Congress wanted to
reach both "legitimate" and "illegitimate" enterprises...
We nonetheless recognize that, in its private civil version, RICO is evolving into
something quite different from the original concept of its enactors .... The "extraor-
dinary" uses to which civil RICO has been put appear to be primarily the result of the
breadth of the predicate offenses, in particular the inclusion of wire, mail, and securi-
ties fraud, and the failure of Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful concept
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The civil remedies of section 895.05 are available for violations of
chapter 895, which primarily targets individuals engaged in a "pattern
of racketeering activity." 65 The remedies include divesting the of-
fender of any interest in the enterprise; imposing reasonable restric-
tions upon the offender's activities and investments; dissolving or
reorganizing the organization; suspending or revoking a license or per-
mit granted to the enterprise by a state agency; and forfeiting or re-
voking the charter of a Florida corporation or a foreign corporation
organized to do business within the State.66 Additionally, section
895.05 gives the State, including any of its agencies, instrumentalities,
subdivisions, or municipalities, a cause of action for three times the
actual damages sustained if it proves by clear and convincing evidence
that it has been injured as a result of any violation of the RICO stat-
ute. 67 Nevertheless, if the court finds the claim to be without any sub-
stantial factual or. legal support, the defendant may recover
reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 68
Except for three important differences, the civil remedies available
under chapter 772 are similar to those available under section 895.05.
First, in stating the prohibited conduct, section 772.103 uses the
phrase "pattern of criminal activity" instead of "pattern of racketeer-
ing activity," 69 apparently to avoid damaging the defendant's reputa-
tion by being labeled a "racketeer" as a result of the filing of the civil
of "pattern."
Id. at 499-500 (citations omitted); see Mary C. Green, Recent Changes in Florida RICO, FLA.
B.J., Nov. 1988, at 75-77 (discussing the abuses that the federal courts experienced with federal
civil RICO actions).
65. See discussion infra part IV.B.
66. FLA. STAT. 6 895.05 (1991).
67. Id. The State may also recover trial and appellate attorneys' fees and reasonable costs
of litigation and investigation. Id.
68. Id.
69. Section 772.103, Florida Statutes, provides that it is unlawful for any person:
(1) Who has with criminal intent received any proceeds derived, directly or indi-
rectly, from a pattern of criminai activity or through the collection of an unlawful
debt to use or invest, whether directly or indirectly, any part of such proceeds, or the
proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof, in the acquisition of any title to,
or any right, interest, or equity in, real property or in the establishment or operation
of any enterprise.
(2) Through a pattern of criminal activity or through the collection of an unlawful
debt, to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any
enterprise or real property.
(3) Employed by, or associated with, any enterprise to conduct or participate, di-
rectly or indirectly, in such enterprise through a pattern of criminal activity or the
collection of an unlawful debt.
(4) To conspire or endeavor to violate any of the provisions of subsection (1), sub-
section (2), or subsection (3).
Cf. FLA. STAT. § 895.03 (1991).
FLORIDA'S RICO ACT
action .7 Notwithstanding the distinction and probably because the
terms are similarly defined, at least one Florida court required proof
of a "pattern of racketeering activity" in an action for temporary in-
junctive relief pursuant to section 772.103'.7 Thus, in this respect, the
separation of the civil remedies and the substitution of the phrases
seems to have no real effect. This also seems to defeat one of the ap-
parent reasons for dividing the remedies-to avoid injury to the de-
fendant's reputation by the mere filing of the civil RICO action.
Second, the definition of the phrase "pattern of criminal activity" in
section 772.102 states that it "shall not include two or more incidents
of fraudulent conduct arising out of a single contract or transaction
against one or more related persons." ' 72 The Legislature apparently
added this language to prevent litigants from bringing the types of
suits used to abuse the federal civil RICO remedy. Third, section
772.104 allows a prevailing plaintiff to recover minimum damages in
the amount of $200, reasonable trial and appellate attorneys' fees,
and costs without any consideration of the defendant's ability to pay
such fees and costs. 73
Like Florida, the federal RICO Act also affords plaintiffs civil rem-
edies, including divesting the defendant of any interest in the enter-
prise and imposing reasonable restrictions on the defendant's future
activities or investments, when the RICO violation affects interstate
commerce. 74 However, at least one federal court has held that while
Florida courts have concurrent jurisdiction over RICO claims, they do
not have the power to require plaintiffs to exhaust state remedies prior
to bringing federal civil RICO actions. 75
In the early years of RICO prosecutions, these civil remedies were
overlooked; 7 but, the advantages they offer over criminal RICO ac-
70. See Green, supra note 64, at 76.
71. Shouten v. Utah Int'l, Inc., 515 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). It is unclear from this
brief opinion whether the court was aware that the phrase "pattern of racketeering activity"
does not appear in section 772.103, Florida Statutes, or whether the court instead believed that
the substitution of the phrase in section 772.103 had no effect on the showing previously re-
quired by section 895.02. Cf Green, supra note 63, at 76 (suggesting that cases interpreting
section 895.03 should be used for guidance in section 772.103 civil actions).
72. FLA. STAT. § 772.102(4) (1991). "Related persons" are defined as natural "persons who
are related by blood within the second degree or who are married and, as to other persons,
persons which are substantially under the same direction, ownership, or control, either directly
or indirectly." Id. § 777.102(6).
73. Section 772.19, however, does not allow damages to be recovered under chapter 772
against the state or its agencies, instrumentalities, subdivisions, or municipalities. Id. § 772.19.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988); see Armbrister v. Roland Int'l. Corp., 667 F. Supp. 802 (M.D.
Fla. 1987).
75. Glickstein v. Sun Bank/Miami, N.A., 922 F.2d 666, 674 (11th Cir. 1991).
76. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 482 (1985).
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tions may account for their increased use by litigants and consequent
misuse. 7 Generally, the civil RICO plaintiff must prove a RICO viola-
tion, injury to business or property, and that the violation caused the
injury. 7 However, the level of proof required in these civil actions is
lower than the level required in criminal RICO actions .79 Also, if a
final judgment or decree is rendered in favor of the State in the crimi-
nal RICO action and the civil action is based on that same conduct,
the judgment or decree estops the defendant as to all matters which it
would have if the plaintiff had been a party in the criminal action.8°
Additionally, in resolving a conflict within the federal courts,8l the
United States Supreme Court has held that a criminal conviction is a
not a prerequisite for bringing a federal civil RICO action."2 The
Court based its holding upon the rationale that this requirement does
not appear in the provisions governing either civil or criminal RICO
actions, and that the requirement of a RICO "violation" does not
imply a criminal conviction. 3 The Court also noted that such a re-
quirement would be inconsistent with Congress' underlying policy
concerns and would severely handicap potential plaintiffs.8 The Flor-
ida Act offers another advantage in that the commencement of a civil
RICO action does not preclude the plaintiff from pursuing any other
civil or criminal remedy."' With one exception, however, Florida civil
actions must be brought within five years after the prohibited conduct
77. Id.
78. See Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572 (llth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 913 (1992);
Kingston Square Tenants Ass'n v. Tuskegee Gardens, Ltd., 792 F. Supp. 1566 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
Aut see Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 981 (1988).
79. See FLA. STAT. §§ 772.104, 895.05(7) (1991). Cf. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d
1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that a lower standard is applicable because it is the same kind
of equitable relief that federal courts have been granting for generations under section 4 of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, and sections 4 and 25 of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 12-27), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); Banderas v. Banco Cent. del Ecuador,
461 So. 2d 265, 271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (substantial, competent evidence). In Sedima, the
United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that the predicates must be established by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt and suggested that a lower standard may apply, but did not
address the nature of the standard. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 492.
80. FLA. STAT. §§ 772.14, 895.05(8) (1991).
81. Cf. USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95'n.1 (6th Cir. 1982)
(conviction under section 1982 is not a prerequisite for a civil RICO action). Accord Bunker
Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1983). Contra Viola v.
Bensalem Township, 601 F. Supp. 1086, 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (convictions on predicate acts are
prerequisites for standing in a federal civil RICO action), vacated, 774 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1985).
82. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 488-90.
83. Id. Cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1962, 1964 (1988).
84. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 488-90.
85. FLA. STAT. §§ 772.18, 895.05(11) (1991).
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terminates or the cause of action accrues. 86 In contrast, federal civil
actions are subject to a four-year statute of limitations . 7
IV. THE NET TANGLES
The Florida courts have encountered numerous obstacles in at-
tempting to construe the Florida RICO Act in accordance with its
original legislative intent. The courts have looked to federal decisions
interpreting the federal RICO Act for guidance in certain areas, but in
other areas have chosen to reject the federal interpretation of the fed-
eral Act and to fashion the Florida RICO Act differently, but not
without some criticism.8
The primary criticism of the Florida courts' decision to look to fed-
eral decisions in interpreting the Florida RICO Act stems from the
presence of a "liberal construction clause" in Title IX of the Crime
Control Act of 1970, from which the federal Act was derived. The
clause states that "the provisions of this title shall be liberally con-
strued to effectuate its remedial purposes. "89 Federal courts have con-
strued this phrase as authority to broadly interpret the federal RICO
Act. For example, when the United States Supreme Court ruled that
the federal Act applied to both legitimate and illegitimate businesses,
it noted that the presence of this clause and the absence of any ambi-
guity in the provision defining the term "enterprise" rendered the rule
of lenity inapplicable.9 Critics argue that the federal courts' decision
to adhere to the liberal construction clause fails to follow the tradi-
tional principle of statutory construction that penal statutes shall be
subject to strict interpretation, or at the very least, that their words be
given no more than their normal meanings. 9' Others argue that in en-
acting the federal RICO Act, Congress overreacted to the problem of
organized crime and made the Act too broad, and that this, coupled
with judicial zeal in enforcing it, has resulted in the prosecution of
individuals Congress did not intend to reach.92
86. Id. §§ 772.17, 895.05(10).
87. Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank, Inc., 906 F.2d 1546, 1550 (11 th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1695 (1991); Wilder v. Meyer, 779 F. Supp. 164, 168 (S.D. Fla.
1991).
88. See Tarlow, supra note 7, at 177-78; Dowd, supra note 24, at 24.
89. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947.
90. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588 (1981).
91. See Jeff Atkinson, "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations," 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-68: Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. oF Caut. L. & CRIBMUOLOOY 1, 3
(1978).
92. See Craig M. Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65
IOWA L. Rav. 837 (1980).
19931
396 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:381
Nevertheless, even though Florida courts have looked to federal de-
cisions for guidance in interpreting the Florida RICO Act, they have
recognized that because the Act imposes enhanced sentences, they
must adhere to the rule of construction that requires that provisions
of the Florida Criminal Code and offenses defined by other statutes
shall be strictly construed.93 In determining whether the elements of a
RICO violation have been established, the Florida courts' acknow-
ledgment of this rule of strict construction appears to be inconsistent
with their decision to follow federal decisions which broadly interpret
the federal RICO Act.
Florida courts have recognized the following three elements as re-
quisites to establishing a violation of the Florida RICO Act: (1) the
defendant committed two or more incidents of the conduct enumer-
ated in section 895.02(1) that have the same or similar intents, results,
accomplices, victims, methods of commission, or that otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics, and in doing so, (2) the
defendant associated with an enterprise and participated in the con-
duct of the enterprise's affairs through (3) a pattern of racketeering
activity. 94 Each element will be discussed separately below, along with
an analysis of the special issues that remain unresolved in RICO con-
spiracy prosecutions.
A. Enterprise Element
The Florida RICO Act defines the term "enterprise" as meaning:
any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation,
business trust, union chartered under the laws of this state, or other
legal entity, or any unchartered union, association, or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity; and it
includes illicit as well as licit enterprises and governmental, as welf as
other, entities. 95
This definition is much broader than the definition provided in the
federal RICO Act, and, on its face, reaches legitimate as well as ille-
gitimate businesses. Alternatively, the federal Act defines "enter-
prise" as including any "individual, partnership, corporation,
93. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(1) (1991). See, e.g., Flanagan v. State, 566 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1990). See also Dowd, supra note 24, at 159-63.
94. See Boyd v. State, 578 So. 2d 718, 721 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Shimek v. State, 610 So. 2d
632, 634-35 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S.-479, 496
(1985). The federal RICO Act additionally requires that the prohibited activity affect interstate
or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
95. FLA. STAT. § 895.02(3) (1991).
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association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of indivi-
duals associated in fact although not a legal entity.'' As the federal
Act's definition does not encompass sole proprietorships, the federal
Act is narrower in scope than the Florida Act. Although both Acts
cover any "person" engaging in the prohibited conduct, only the fed-
eral RICO Act defines that term. Under the federal Act, the term
"person" includes "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal
or beneficial interest in property." 9 Even though the federal Act, un-
like the Florida Act, does not expressly state that it reaches legitimate
as well as illegitimate businesses, the United States Supreme Court has
resolved the conflict between the circuits by clearly holding that it
does. 9
Under both Acts, an "enterprise" is an entity separate from the
pattern of activity in which it engages. 99 This separation permits the
State to prosecute an individual for more than one violation of the
Act in connection with the same enterprise as long as each violation
involves a different pattern of racketeering activity.t ° ° In such cases,
there are multiple counts within the information or indictment to
charge the enterprise with separate patterns of racketeering activities.
In response to numerous double jeopardy challenges, the federal
courts have developed five factors that must be considered in deter-
mining whether multiple indictments or informations charge the exis-
tence of one or several patterns of racketeering activity. Those factors
are: (1) whether the activities that allegedly constitute two different
RICO patterns occurred during the same time period; (2) whether the
activities occurred in the same place; (3) whether the activities in-
volved the same persons; (4) whether the multiple indictments alleged
violations of the same criminal statutes; and (5) whether the overall
nature and scope of the activities set forth in the indictments were the
same.' 0' However, no similar factors have been developed to deter-
mine whether separate enterprises are involved in such prosecutions. ,02
96. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
97. Id. § 1961(3).
98. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 584-88 (1981); see discussion supra part 11.
99. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 584; Boyd v. State, 578 So. 2d 718, 721 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev.
denied, 581 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1991).
100. United States v. Ruggiero, 754 F.2d 927, 931-32 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(985); see United States v. Russotti, 717 F.2d 27, 33 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022
(1984); United States v. Dean, 647 F.2d 779, 787 (8th Cir. 1981), modified on reh'g on other
grounds, 667 F.2d 729 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982).
101. Ruggiero, 754 F.2d at 932; see Russotti, 717 F.2d at 33; Dean, 647 F.2d at 787.
102. While the Ruggiero court noted the absence of such factors, the court declined to ad-
dress this issue because it found that it was not relevant in resolving the. issues actually raised on
appeal. 754 F.2d at 934-35 n.15.
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Although both Acts state that they apply to "individuals associated
in fact although not a legal entity," the courts have generally required
more than a showing of a mere association of criminals to establish
the "enterprise" element. 103 A number of RICO cases have been dis-
missed or have had convictions reversed because the prosecutors failed
to realize this limitation of the Acts.104 The courts have held that there
must be evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal,
with various associates who function as ,a continuing unit. 05 The
group or organization must have an identifiable decision-making
structure and a mechanism for controlling and directing the group on
a continuous basis. 10 Further, the prosecution must prove that the
various associates function as a continuous unit. 107 The prosecution
must also show that the organization has an existence separate and
apart from the pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages.,
Accordingly, this element is not satisfied if the prosecutor merely
shows that the defendant acted alone in committing the underlying
offenses.'°9 For example, in one Florida RICO case, the court reversed
a conviction where, at trial and in the amended information, the State
charged that the defendant was the enterprise, that is, that he'was em-
ployed by himself and associated with himself to conduct or partici-
pate in a pattern of racketeering activity. 10
103. See, e.g., Turkette, 452 U.S. at 576; State v. Russell, 611 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 2d DCA
1992); State v. Rutledge, 611 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Boyd, 578 So. 2d at 718.
104. See, e.g., Flynn, 852 F.2d at 1045; Russell, 611 So. 2d at 1263; Boyd, 578 So. 2d at 718.
105. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 584; Boyd, 578 So. 2d at 722.
106. See Russell, 611 So. 2d at 1267; Rutledge, 611 So. 2d at 1265; Boyd, 578 So. 2d at 718.
To satisfy this requirement the state must show more than that there were conversations between
the members of the group or organization indicating that the group was engaged in a certain
activity or transaction. See, e.g., Rutledge, 611 So. 2d at 1265 (affirming dismissal of a RICO
charge for lack of a prima facie showing of the existence of a criminal enterprise where the
state's only evidence on the RICO charge was a recorded telephone conversation between the co-
defendants which indicated buy/sell transactions between the two individuals); see also Russell,
611 So. 2d at 1265 (companion case to Rutledge).
107. Boyd, 578 So. 2d at 722. As will be discussed further below, "continuity" is also a
requirement of the "pattern of racketeering activity" element. See discussion infra part IV.B.
108. Boyd, 578 So. 2d at 722. Accord United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045, 1051 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974 (1988).
109. See Dorsey v. State, 613 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Day v. State, 541 So. 2d 1202
(Fla. 2d DCA 1988), rev. denied, 545 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1989); State v. Smith, 532 So. 2d 1112
(Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 542 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 1988).
110. Wilson v. State, 596 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); see Napoli v. State, 596 So. 2d 782
(Fla. 1st DCA) (motions to dismiss amended information and for judgment of acquittal should
have been granted where the information charged that the defendant conducted himself as an
enterprise or associated with himself as an enterprise), rev. denied, 604 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1992);
Craver v. State, 561 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (motion for judgment of acquittal improp-
erly denied where the defendant was prosecuted as a "one man enterprise"); State v. Nishi, 521
So. 2d 252 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 531 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 1988) (the defendant could not be
employed or associated with himself as an enterprise under the RICO Act).
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Similarly, this element is not satisfied where nothing exists linking
the members of the organization to each other except the commission
of the predicate offenses. For example, in one Florida case, the State
only proved that over a period of three weeks, four teenagers, who
knew little about each other, drove through Dade County, looking for
ways to obtain fast money by threat or force, and committed random
acts of violence toward that end."' In reversing the defendants' RICO
convictions, the court explained, "[i]t is clear . . . that in enacting the
RICO statute, Congress did not intend to use RICO to prosecute
criminals who merely get together to commit sporadic acts of
crime.""'
B. Pattern Element
The Florida RICO Act defines "pattern of racketeering activity" as
engaging in at least two incidents of "racketeering conduct" that have
the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods
of commission, or that are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated incidents."' This definition is more
detailed than that provided in the federal RICO Act. The federal Act
provides that a pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering ac-
tivity... ,, Many have criticized the federal "definition" of this
phrase as not being an actual definition, but merely an explanation of
the proof required to establish a pattern of racketeering activity.", It
has also been criticized as being vague and simply a description of
what the phrase does not mean. 116
This criticism is warranted because the pattern of racketeering activ-
ity is the key conduct prohibited by the Act. Although the United
States Supreme Court has expressed agreement with this criticism, it
has not found the definition to be unconstitutionally vague. In H.J.,
Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., the Court stated:
111. Boyd, 578So. 2dat722.
112. Id. at 720.
113. FLA. STAT. § 895.02(4) (1991). As discussed infra in part IV.C., the definition also re-
quires that at least one of the incidents occur after the effective date of the Act and that the last
incident occur within five years after a prior incident of racketeering conduct. Id.
114. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). The remainder of the definition requires that at least one of
the acts occur after the effective date of the chapter and the last occur within ten years (exclud-
ing any period of imprisonment) after the commission of the prior act of racketeering activity.
See discussion infra part IV.C.
115. See United States v. Ladmer, 429 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Tarlow, supra
note 7, at 209-13; Dowd, supra note 24, at 140.
116. See Ladmer, 429 F. Supp. at 1244; see also Sandra B. Ross, Comment, The Pattern
Element of RICO Before and After Sedima: A Look at Both Federal and Florida RICO, 15 FLA.
ST. U. L. Rav. 321, 321-22 (1987).
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As we remarked in Sedima, supra, 473 U.S., at 496, n. 14, 105 S.
Ct., at 3285, n. 14, the section of the statute headed "definitions,"
18 U.S.C. § 1961, does not so much define a pattern of racketeering
activity as state a minimum necessary condition for the existence of
such a pattern. Unlike other provisions in § 1961 that tell us what
various concepts used in the Act "mean," § 1961(5) says of the
phrase "pattern of racketeering activity" only that it "requires at
least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after
[October 15, 1970] and the last of which occurred within ten years
(excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a
prior act of racketeering activity." It thus places an outer limit on
the concept of a pattern of racketeering activity that is broad
indeed."17
In H.J., the Court also addressed deficiencies in the federal definition
and the showing necessary to establish this element of the racketeering
offense. The Court stated that the legislative history of the federal
RICO Act reveals that Congress intended for the plaintiff or prosecu-
tor to prove a pattern of racketeering activity, and thus, a showing
must be made that the racketeering predicates are related (relatedness
requirement) and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued
criminal activity (continuity requirement).' 8
With respect to the relatedness requirement, the Supreme Court
held that the requisite showing could not be more constrained than
that used in Title X of the Organized Crime Control Act (OCCA).' 1' "
Under the OCCA, "criminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces
criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, partici-
pants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interre-
lated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events."' 120
However, using this approach to read a relatedness requirement into
the federal RICO Act has been criticized because of this requirement's
absence from Title IX of the Crime Control Act, from which the fed-
eral RICO Act was derived.' 2' Additionally, when Congress chooses to
include language in one statute and not another, it does not intend
that the language apply to the latter statute.'2 Nonetheless, despite
117. 492 U.S. 229, 237 (1989); see Ross, supra note 116, at 323-43 (discussing the conflict in
the federal courts prior to the H.J. decision concerning the proper interpretation of the phrase
"pattern of racketeering activity").
118. H.J., 492 U.S. at 239.
119. As stated in supra note 12, the federal RICO Act originated from Title IX of the Or-
ganized Crime Control Act.
120. H.J., 492 U.S. at 239-40 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)).
121. Tarlow, supra note 7, at 215.
122. Id.
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this criticism, this requirement is useful because it narrows the scope
of the federal Act by reducing the possibility that prosecutors will use
the Act to prosecute in one action all the crimes committed by a per-
son on the basis that an illegal enterprise was involved. 123
As to the continuity requirement, H.J. describes "continuity" as
both a "closed" and "open-ended" concept, "referring either to a
closed period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its na-
ture projects into the future with a threat of repetition.' ' 2 4 Thus, a
party alleging a violation of the RICO Act may demonstrate continu-
ity using the close-ended method by proving a series of related predi-
cates extending over a substantial period of time. One mistake made
in a number of racketeering prosecutions brought by eager prosecu-
tors is to bring the prosecution before continuity can be proved by this
method.121 In these situations, the open-ended concept may be applied
provided there is either explicit or implicit proof of a threat of long-
term racketeering activity. To do so, there must be proof that the
predicates are part of the entity's regular way of doing business, that
the predicates are part of a long-term association that exists 1for crimi-
nal purposes, or that the predicates are a regular way of conducting
an ongoing legitimate business or RICO "enterprise."' ' 26 One com-
mentator has suggested that by imposing these requirements, H.J.
may have sharply decreased the usefulness of the Act, 2 7 or at least has
warned Congress that unless it modifies and clarifies the federal RICO
Act, the judiciary is prepared to "throw up its hands in surrender to
RICO's ambiguous language."''1 8 Critics also charge that nothing on
the face of the federal Act suggests that "continuity" and "related-
ness" are part of the pattern element.
The Florida Supreme Court has held that the "pattern" element of
the Florida RICO Act is similar to that used in the federal Act.1 29 This
necessarily means that, consistent with H.J.'s construction of the pat-
tern element of the federal RICO Act, the pattern element of the Flor-
ida Act also should require proof of relatedness and continuity. 30
Unlike the federal Act, the relatedness requirement is already part of
123. See id.
124. H.J., 492 U.S. at 241-42.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 242-43; see discussion supra part IV.A.
127. David W. Fassett, Mother of Mercy, Is this the End of RICO?, 6 Cium. JUST. 13
(Spring 1991).
128. Id.; see Yellow Bus Lines v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, & Helpers Local Union 639, 913 F.2d
948, 957-58 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Mikva, C.J., concurring) (urging Congress to "apply logic and
order to the statute called RICO"), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2839 (1991).
129. Bowden v. State, 402 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1981).
130. Id.
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the Florida RICO Act's definition of the phrase "pattern of racketeer-
ing activity."'' Consequently, Florida courts have consistently im-
posed that requirement as part of the pattern element.' 32 Like the
federal Act, however, the Florida RICO Act's definition of the phrase
does not indicate that a showing of "continuity" is required. None-
theless, the Florida Supreme Court held in 1981 that the Florida Act,
like the federal Act, requires a showing of continuity as part of the
pattern element.' 33 Despite this ruling, uncertainty remained in the dis-
trict courts as to the proof required to establish continuity. The Flor-
ida Supreme Court recently re-addressed this issue in State v. Lucas,3 4
in which it approved the concepts expressed by H.J. concerning the
continuity requirement and the proof necessary to establish it.'
Even though the Florida Supreme Court has recognized that conti-
nuity is an essential requirement of the pattern element on which the
jury must be instructed, this requirement is missing from the Standard
Jury Instructions for RICO offenses. 36 Additionally, except for the
instructions on conspiracy to engage in a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity, "'37 the instructions for the offenses prohibited by section 895.03 do
not clearly indicate that the state must prove a "pattern of racketeer-
ing activity" for offenses that clearly require such a showing. This
includes offenses such as using or investing proceeds received from or
derived through a pattern of racketeering activity, acquiring or main-
taining control of an enterprise or real property through a pattern of
racketeering activity, and being employed by or associating with an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.'38 The First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal found this deficiency to be reversible error in
Shimek v. State.13 9
In Shimek, the defendant appealed his convictions on three counts
of grand theft and one count of conducting or participating in an en-
terprise through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of the
131. SeeFL. STAT. § 895.03 (1991).
132. See, e.g., Bowden, 402 So. 2d at 1173; State v. Lucas, 600 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 1992).
133. Bowden, 402 So. 2d at 1174-75.
134. 600 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 1992).
135. See Shimek v. State, 610 So. 2d 632, 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
136. See FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CmIm.) 261-72 (1992).
137. Id. at 270-71.
138. Id. at 261-69. Such an instruction is properly omitted from the instructions for offenses
relating to collection of an unlawful debt prohibited by section 895.03, Florida Statutes, because
this section indicates that those offenses do not require a showing of a pattern of racketeering
activity. Those offenses include acquiring or maintaining interest or control of an enterprise or
real property through the collection of an unlawful debt, using or investing proceeds derived
from the collection of an unlawful debt, or being employed by or associating with an enterprise
through the collection of an unlawful debt. FLA. STAT. § 895.03 (1991).
139. 610 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
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Florida RICO Act.' 40 He contended that the trial court erroneously
denied his request for the jury instruction on the racketeering charge
and that the instruction actually read to the jury was not only incor-
rect, but directed the jury to find against him on the essential facts.' 4'
The instruction requested by the defendant read:
Before you can find the defendant guilty of conducting or
participating in an enterprise, the State must prove the following two
elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. The defendant was employed by or associated with an
enterprise.
2. The defendant conducted or participated, directly or indirectly,
in such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity by
engaging in at least two of the following incidents of Grand theft as
charged in Counts I, II, III, and IV of the Information.
3. Of those incidents in which the defendant was engaged, at least
two of them had the same or similar intents, results, accomplices,
victims, methods of commission, or were interrelated by
distinguishing characteristics and were not isolated incidents.
In order to constitute a pattern of racketeering activity, the
incidents must amount to or otherwise constitute a threat of
continuing racketeering activity.f42
Except for the emphasized language, the defendant's instruction is
identical to the Standard Jury Instruction in Criminal Cases, intended
to be given when the defendant is charged with racketeering based on
"conduct or participation in an enterprise through a pattern of racket-
eering activity." 43 The trial court denied the defendant's jury instruc-
tion request and instead instructed the jury as follows:
Before you can find the defendant guilty of unlawful conduct or
conducting or participating in an enterprise, the State must prove the
following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: The defendant
was employed by or associated with an enterprise; two, the
defendant conducted or participated directly or indirectly in such
enterprise by engaging in at least two of the following elements,
following incidents of grand theft that is charged in Counts 1, 11, 111
and IV. As charged in the information, of course, three of those
incidents in which the defendant was engaged, at least two of them
had the same or similar, intent, results, accomplices, victims,
140. Id. at 633.
141. Id. at 637.
142. Id.
143. FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (Cam.) 269 (1992).
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methods of commission or were interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and were not isolated incidents .... I
While this instruction apparently was patterned after the Standard
Jury Instruction, it clearly was not consistent with the standard in-
struction, especially the emphasized portions . 4, The court held that,
with respect to the pattern element which, according to Lucas, in-
cluded a continuity requirement, 146 the trial court committed reversible
error in failing to instruct the jury according to the defendant's re-
quested instruction. 147 The court then found that both the instruction
given by the trial court and the Standard Jury Instruction fail to ade-
quately instruct on the continuity requirement described in Lucas and
Bowden.'4 The court held that the denial of the requested instruction
was erroneous because the defendant was entitled to have the jury in-
structed by the trial court on each essential element of the case that is
disputed and material to the defense.' 41 Accordingly, the denial of the
requested instruction deprived the defendant of a fair trial on the
racketeering count, especially in light of the confusing instruction ac-
tually given by the trial court. 10 Thus, as to the pattern element of
RICO offenses, the Standard Jury Instructions are deficient and must
be amended to reflect the proper showing recognized by the Florida
Supreme Court and section 895.03.
C. Incidents/Acts
The Florida RICO Act requires at least two "incidents" of racket-
eering conduct,"' in contrast with the two "acts" of racketeering re-
quired by the federal Act."1 2 Florida courts have held that by using the
144. Shimek, 610 So. 2d at 638.
145. Id.
146. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
147. Shimek, 610 So. 2d at 638.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 638-39. The court noted that the lack of proof of the requisite continuity to prove
a pattern of racketeering activity was the defendant's principal defense to the RICO charge at
trial, and the defense attorney argued this defense even though the trial court refused to instruct
on it. Id.
150. Id. at 639. The court also agreed with the defendant's argument that the instruction
read to the jury amounted to a peremptory or conclusive instruction on certain critical facts as
well as a comment on the evidence by the trial court, even though not intended as such by the
judge; however, this error was not a basis for reversal because the defendant did not make a
contemporaneous objection to those deficiencies. Id.
151. FLA. STAT. § 895.02(4) (1991).
152. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). Yet, where the prosecution under both RICO Acts involves
the collection of an unlawful debt, proof of only one collection is necessary. Id. § 1962(a); FLA.
STAT. 6 895.03(2) (1991); see United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 661 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
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term "incidents" rather than "acts," the Florida Legislature chose
not to adopt the federal standard, but instead intended to narrow the
scope of the Florida Act.' Some have criticized this interpretation as
being both inconsistent with the Legislature's intent to make the Flor-
ida RICO Act broader than the federal Act and contrary to the sug-
gestion that the Florida Act is the nation's toughest RICO Act."1
4
Consequently, as applied, if in a single criminal episode or transaction
a defendant commits two predicate offenses, this generally would sat-
isfy the federal Act, but not the narrower Florida Act. 5 Some Florida
courts and prosecutors have failed to recognize this important distinc-
tion between the use of these different terms and their effect on RICO
prosecutions. Consequently, some actions have been dismissed and
convictions have been reversed on these grounds.'5 6
As previously noted, both Acts also require a showing of continu-
ity, including similarity and relatedness, between or among the predi-
cate incidents or acts as part of the pattern element.' 57 Both Acts also
impose time limits on when the predicate incidents or acts must oc-
cur."18 Furthermore, both require that at least one of the incidents or
acts occur after the effective date of the RICO Act. 59 However, while
the federal Act requires that the last predicate act occur within ten
years (excluding imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act,'6
the Florida Act requires only that the last incident occur within five
years after a prior incident of racketeering conduct. 6' Both Acts are
silent as to the time period over which the predicates must occur, but
periods ranging from two to six months have been found to be suffi-
cient for the Florida RICO Act,' 62 and two-and-one-half months has
153. State v. Russo, 493 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), rev. denied, 504 So. 2d 768 (Fla.
1987); see State v. Lucas, 600 So. 2d 1093, 1095-96 (Fla. 1992); Watts v. State, 558 So. 2d 142
(Fla. 3d DCA 1990). The courts, however, have attached no significance to the Florida Act's use
of the phrase "pattern of racketeering conduct" in its definition of the phrase "pattern of rack-
eteering activity."
154. See Dowd, supra note 24, at 146.
155. Compare In re Sahlen & Assocs., Inc. Securities Litigation, 773 F. Supp. 342, 366 (S.D.
Fla. 1991) (requirement satisfied) with Watts, 558 So. 2d at 144 (requirement not satisfied).
156. See, e.g., Watts, 558 So. 2d at 144.
157. See discussion supra part IV.B. and accompanying notes.
158. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988); FLA. STAT. § 895.02(4) (1991).
159. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988); FLA. STAT. § 895.02(4) (1991).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
161. FLA. STAT. § 895.02(4) (1991).
162. See State v. Lucas, 600 So. 2d 1093 (Fla" 1992) (six-month boiler room operation which
defrauded investors); Moorehead v. State, 383 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1980) (five auto thefts over a
two-month period); Harvey v. State, 617 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (four-month opera-
tion of a foundation in several Florida counties with the averred purpose of raising money to
provide wheelchairs, therapy, and diapers for children with Spina Bifida through solicitors who
represented that 70% of the money raised would be used for those purposes).
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been found to be sufficient for the federal Act. 163
Neither Act specifies where predicates must occur. One Florida
court has held that, under the Florida RICO Act, the predicate inci-
dents need not occur inside Florida. 64 The federal Act apparently
does not require that the conduct occur inside the United States. In
the federal racketeering prosecution brought against Manuel Noriega,
the former head of the intelligence branch of the Panamanian Na-
tional Guard and Commander-in-Chief of the Panamanian Defense
Force, the federal district court held that the conduct may occur out-
side the United States as long as it produces effects or is intended to
produce effects within the United States, a concept that has not yet
been defined. 16 This action by the United States Government has been
criticized as one taken without any concerted effort to examine the
legal and prudential ramifications of the growing use of criminal jus-
tice mechanisms in foreign affairs, which may be more suitably gov-
erned by international law or foreign policy. 166This criticism has some
merit as the Noriega holding suggests that the boundaries of the fed-
eral RICO Act are virtually unlimited as long as there is proof that the
racketeering activity produces effects in the United States or was in-
tended to produce effects in the United States.
D. RICO Conspiracy
Both the federal and Florida Acts have similar conspiracy provi-
sions that make it unlawful for any person to conspire to violate the
provisions that set forth the prohibited criminal activity. 167 The Flor-
ida conspiracy provision additionally makes it unlawful for any per-
son to endeavor to violate section 895.13.16s However, neither Act
adequately explains the showing required to prove conspiracy to vio-
late either Act. Only the federal courts have squarely addressed this
issue, but not without some dissension.
The first federal court to render an opinion on the issue, the former
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, construed the conspiracy provision in
163. See United States v. Busacca, 936 F.2d 232 (6th Cir.) (misappropriation of welfare and
pension funds over a period of approximately two-and-one-half months), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
595 (1991).
164. Domberg v. State, 518 So. 2d 1360, 1361 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 529 So. 2d 693
(Fla. 1988).
165. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1516-17 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
166. Jean E. Engelmayer, Foreign Policy by Indictment: Using Legal Tools Against Foreign
Officials Involved in Drug Trafficking, 8 CnsM. J. ETucs 3 (Summer/Fall 1989).
167. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988); FLA. STAT. § 895.03(4) (1991).
168. FLA. STAT. § 895.03(4) (1991).
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the federal Act to require a showing different from that required in
traditional conspiracy cases. 19 United States v. Elliott170 involved a
federal racketeering prosecution of six co-defendants who had alleg-
edly participated in over twenty different criminal acts. The acts in-
cluded burning an unoccupied nursing home, stealing meat and dairy
products, attempting to influence the outcome of the stolen meat trial,
operating a car theft ring, stealing a dump truck, selling stolen prop-
erty, selling illegal drugs, and murdering a police informant. 17 In af-
firming the defendants' RICO conspiracy convictions, the court
refused to apply traditional conspiracy notions. 172 It found that Con-
gress intended the federal RICO Act to authorize the single prosecu-
tion of a multifaceted, diverse conspiracy and to replace traditional
conspiracy notions in those cases with the concept of "enterprise."' ' 7
The court stated that the nature of a RICO conspiracy relates to an
agreement to participate in the affairs of an enterprise, rather than an
agreement to commit the predicate crimes constituting the enter-
prise. 1 4 As support for this holding, the court looked to the Statement
of Findings and Purpose in the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
which states that the Act was designed to "seek the eradication of
organized crime ...by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by
providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the un-
lawful activities of those engaged in organized crime." 75
Since Elliott, the federal circuit courts have issued conflicting opi-
nions on whether traditional conspiracy principles apply to RICO con-
spiracy cases and whether the agreement is one to participate in the
affairs of the enterprise or to commit the predicate offenses. For ex-
ample, while the Third and the Eleventh Circuits have followed El-
liott,17 6 the Eighth Circuit has criticized Elliott's holding as to the
nature of RICO conspiracy, stating that nothing in the statutory
scheme of the federal RICO Act suggests that Congress intended to
discard traditional legal precepts applicable to criminal activity and to
expand federal jurisdiction to the extent stated in Elliott. 177
169. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 884-96.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 902-03.
175. Id. at 902.
176. See, e.g., United States v. Vastola, 899 F.2d 211 (3d Cir.), vacated, 497 U.S. 1001
(1990); United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1001 (1986); United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632 (11th Cir. 1984).
177. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912
(1981); see United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916
(1981); United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979), decision vacated, 642 F.2d 1001
(6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
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Elliott has also been criticized for reaching remote associates of the
enterprise who may not know of the full scope of the conspiracy as
the opinion requires only that they know of the essential nature of the
enterprise.' 78 The RICO Act may indeed reach individuals that Con-
gress may not have intended it to reach when compared with Con-
gress' statements of the types of activities about which it was
concerned when it enacted the federal Act. Nevertheless, the criticism
that these remote associates should not be reached because they may
not know of the full scope of the conspiracy is questionable because,
as noted previously, no provision in section 1962 of the federal RICO
Act imposes any intent or knowledge requirement.
The federal courts have also split on the issue of whether a RICO
conspiracy prosecution requires proof of an overt act-a requirement
missing from the face of the federal Act. Some federal courts, includ-
ing the former Fifth Circuit, have required proof of an overt act by at
least one conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy. 179 Other federal
courts, like the Eleventh Circuit, however, have held that no such
showing is required.180 The United States Supreme Court has yet to
resolve these conflicts.
Florida's position on these issues is unclear because no reported
Florida case has squarely addressed the issues raised in the federal
courts, notwithstanding the Florida courts' approval of Elliott in
other contexts.' 8 This absence may be due in part to Florida prosecu-
tors using conspiracy as a predicate incident for a RICO violation
rather than charging the defendant with conspiracy to violate the
RICO Act; however, this strategy has not yielded much success.8 2 For
example, in reversing a RICO conviction on the ground that the infor-
178. Tarlow, supra note 7, at 247.
179. See, e.g., United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 949 (1982); Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1146
(D.N.J. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1121 (1985); Medallion TV Enters., Inc. v. SelecTV, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1290 (C.D. Cal. 1986),
aff'd, 833 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 917 (1989).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Tripp, 782 F.2d 38 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1128
(1986); Pepe, 747 F.2d at 632; United States v. Coia, 719 F.2d 1120 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 466 U.S. 973 (1984); United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
857 (1981).
181. See, e.g., Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1971) (distinguishing Elliott on the
issue of whether admission of testimony relating to a murder by members of an organization of
which the defendant was a part is prejudicial error); Beatty v. State, 418 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1982) (citing Elliott on an issue relating to the sufficiency of allegations of predicate inci-
dents in an information).
182. See, e.g., State v. Russo, 493 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (dismissing RICO indict-
ment); Butler v. State, 456 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 2'd DCA 1984) (reversing RICO conviction and
affirming conspiracy convictions); Beatty, 418 So. 2d at 271 (reversing RICO conviction but
affirming the conspiracy conviction).
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mation was legally insufficient by failing to apprise the defendant of
the charge, one Florida court held that informations charging conspir-
acy must be subject to special scrutiny." 3
The Standard Jury Instruction for conspiracy to engage in a pattern
of criminal activity may provide some guidance as to how Florida
courts may handle these issues. With respect to the nature of the
agreement, the instructions require proof of three elements. First, the
evidence must show that "two or more persons . . . came to a mutual
understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan,
namely to engage in a 'pattern of racketeering activity." ' ' l Second,
the instruction requires a showing that the defendant knowingly and
willfully became a member of the conspiracy. "5 Third, there must be a
showing that the defendant joined the conspiracy with the specific in-
tent to engage in at least two incidents of racketeering or with the
specific intent to otherwise participate in the affairs of the enter-
prise. 18 6
Thus, at first glance, these instructions appear to agree both with
Elliott and the cases criticizing it. Nonetheless, this apparent internal
inconsistency may be reconciled in the following manner. The first el-
ement of the offense appears to relate to the nature of the agreement.
By rejecting Elliott's holding that the pertinent agreement is one to
participate in the affairs of the enterprise, the first element approves
of the cases that have held that the agreement is one to commit the
predicate crimes.' 87 The third element relates to the defendant's intent
upon joining the conspiracy, which may be shown by either the
method stated in Elliott (intent to participate in the affairs of the en-
terprise) or the method stated by the courts that have rejected Elliott's
holding (intent to engage in at least two incidents of racketeering ac-
tivity).188
In analyzing whether the Florida RICO Act requires a showing of
an overt act, the Standard Jury Instruction for RICO conspiracy may
provide some guidance. The instruction provides, in pertinent part:
A "conspiracy" is a combination or agreement of two or more
persons to join together to attempt to accomplish an offense which
would be in violation of the law. It is a kind of "partnership in
183. Beatty, 418 So. 2d at 272.
184. FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (Cmam.) 270 (1992).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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criminal purposes" in which each member becomes the agent of
every other member.
Neither must it be proved that all of the persons charged to have
been members of the conspiracy were such nor that the alleged
conspirators actually succeeded in accomplishing their unlawful
objectives nor that any alleged member of the conspiracy did any act
in furtherance of the conspiracy.8 9
These statements suggest that proof of an overt act is not required for
a conviction under Florida's RICO Act.
V. REPAIRING AND TIGHTENING THE NET
Some commentators have suggested that the federal RICO Act as
applied has proven more successful than the Florida RICO Act in pre-
venting organized criminal organizations from infiltrating and cor-
rupting legitimate businesses. In cases involving a large number of
defendants, however, RICO prosecutions generally have succeeded
only against the principal participants. 190 This result is not surprising
considering the significant number of holes present in the "nets" cast
by RICO Acts. Based on the number of holes that have been discov-
ered, the RICO nets appear fragile and may soon disintegrate unless
Congress and the Florida Legislature address the problems revealed by
the federal and Florida courts. To aid the Florida Legislature in that
process, to prevent abuse of the Florida Act in the hands of "over-
zealous prosecutors," 19' and to prevent the dismissal of RICO actions
or reversals of RICO convictions clearly within the scope of the Act, a
few suggestions are recommended not only for the Act itself, but also
for parties involved in such actions. 92
189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
191. United States v. Ruggiero, 754 F.2d 927, 934 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(1985).
192. Some of these suggestions apply equally to the federal RICO Act. Judge Mikva ade-
quately notes the need for such action in his concurring opinion in Yellow Bus Lines v. Drivers,
Chauffeurs, & Helpers Local Union 639:
[lI]t is long past time for Congress to address ambiguities in the [RICO] statute that
courts have wrestled with over the past twenty years. We would be comforted to hear
that Congress intended RICO neither to trump the federal courts' ordinary restraint in
preempting state fraud law, nor to overwhelm the traditional federal labor law bal-
ance. It would be good for Congress, now that passions have cooled and courts have
struggled, to apply logic and order to the statute called RICO.
913 F.2d 948, 957-58 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2839 (1991).
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A. Recommended Changes to the Act
First, the definition of the term "pattern of racketeering activity"
in section 895.02(4) should be amended to reflect that a showing of
continuity is required. While the Florida Supreme Court has clearly
stated that "continuity" is a part of the pattern element, 93 this re-
quirement is not apparent from the face of the Act. This amendment
should also reflect the two recognized methods of proving continu-
ity. 1
Second, the definition of the term "enterprise" in section 895.02(3)
should be amended to reflect that a showing of continuity is required
for this element as well, although this continuity appears to differ
from that required for the pattern element. Again, while the courts
have recognized that such a showing is required, this is not clear from
the face of the Act. In amending this definition, the Legislature may
also consider refining the definition to make clear that "enterprise" is
not intended to reach a group of individuals who commit a few spo-
radic criminal acts. A number of RICO prosecutions have been unsuc-
cessful due to the prosecutors' failure to realize this apparent
legislative intent.
Third, the Florida RICO Act makes no distinction among the sen-
tences imposed for a pattern of racketeering activity based on predi-
cates consisting of felonies, those consisting of misdemeanors, or the
number of predicate incidents involved-all are punishable as first de-
gree felonies. It is unclear whether this was the intended result or
merely an oversight. Regardless of the reason, the Act is arguably un-
fair in this respect because, unlike similar criminal statutes, the sen-
tences proscribed do not account for differing levels of severity of
conduct. One way to eliminate this apparent unfairness is to reduce
the punishment when only a few predicate incidents are involved or
when the violation is based on misdemeanor predicates only. Alterna-
tively, the punishment may be increased when a great number of pred-
icate incidents are involved or when the violation is based on serious
felony predicates only. Another commentator has suggested that the
Legislature make violations based on misdemeanors punishable as
third degree felonies, while violations based on felonies continue to be
punished as first degree felonies.195
Fourth, the Legislature needs to address the issue of where the pred-
icate incidents must occur. The Legislature may choose to narrow the
193. See supra notes 113-35 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
195. Maguire, supra note 25, at 503.
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scope of the Florida RICO Act by indicating that the predicate inci-
dent must occur within the state, or broaden the scope by providing
that they need not occur inside the state.
B. Suggestions for RICO Prosecutions
First and foremost, the Standard Jury Instructions for Florida
RICO offenses must be amended to include the pattern of racketeer-
ing activity element and the need to prove continuity under either of
the two methods stated in H.J.196 While Shimek squarely addressed
this problem and noted the deficiency in the Standard Jury Instruc-
tions,19 the Standard Jury Instructions have not yet been amended to
reflect Shimek's holding. This must be done immediately to avoid rev-
ersals of convictions due to oversight of the instruction's deficiency
after the considerable time and effort expended to obtain racketeering
convictions, and to avoid subsequent duplication of such efforts.
Second, in future racketeering prosecutions, prosecutors and plain-
tiffs must consider which continuity method the action will use even
before the targeted individuals are arrested or the prosecution initi-
ated. This will prevent dismissals of actions or the return of not-guilty
verdicts for failure to prove continuity under the close-ended concept
outlined in H.J. Even though the open-ended concept offers an alter-
native method to prove continuity, this method requires proof of
threatened future criminal activity or proof that the activity is a part
of the enterprise's regular manner of doing business. Such proof may
be difficult to obtain in situations where a business constituting the
enterprise is a shell business with no properly kept records or is on the
verge of bankruptcy or financial ruin. In such cases, the chance of
threatened long-term activity is minimal.
Finally, private individuals affected by racketeering activity should
not overlook the civil remedies available under chapter 772. This
chapter allows a successful plaintiff to obtain treble damages, with a
minimum recovery of $200. However, plaintiffs who seek to abuse
these remedies should note that, if the action is found to be without
any substantial factual or legal support, the defendants may recover
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 198
While some commentators believe that, if properly modified or
clarified, RICO Acts can be a great weapon in the war against organ-
196. See H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
197. Shimek v. State, 610 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
198. See supra notes 59-87 and accompanying text.
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ized crime, others doubt that these Acts will have any appreciable ef-
fect on organized crime. Nevertheless, even if all of the perceived
deficiencies in these Acts are addressed, it is unrealistic to believe that
RICO Acts, or any other legislative act alone, can stem the tide of
organized crime without efforts that separately address the root cause
or causes of such behavior. There is probably no better statement of
this reality than the following:
One factor in organized crime continues to be proven: Criminal
activities continue despite arrests, despite convictions, despite
incarcerations. All syndicate families in Pennsylvania are
incapacitated in some way, yet the gambling, the loansharking, and
the many other activities continue. Because profits are enormous,
new leaders quickly replace the old to fill the public demand for
illegal goods and services. The consumers of these illegal services
have not been deterred from supporting organized crime. They
ignore the violence which hurts innocent people as well as crime
figures. They continue to ignore the fact that we all pay inflated
prices because of criminal monopolies in certain industries. It is the
public which supports organized crime. Only the public can withhold
that support. 99
199. EuoEN DoLEscHAL ET AL., NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CH AND DELINQUENCY, A GuIE
TO THE LITERATURE ON ORGANIZED CRIM: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY CovERING THE YEARS
1967-81, at 10 (1981).
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